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Selkirk epitomizes this increasingly common, vacant
Self, a blur even to himself. He may be known as
Kent Selkirk now, but he’s had several names before,
and as his ex-girlfriend tells Agent Robinson, “next
year he’ll go by something else. He’s still in play. Still
forming. That’s his charm. When we met, he called
himself a Christian. Then he became a ‘deep ecolo-
gist.’ A couple weeks later, on his bedside table, I
found a Koran. On a stack of Penthouse Forums.
Next to a sign-up form for a tai chi class”.1
In 1936, when Walter Benjamin published the
essay The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction,2 he felt cause for alarm: theater had
given way to ﬁlm, literature to the daily press, and
painting to images that were mechanically reprodu-
ced. He wrote in a time when he saw the old
values of the truth content of art, of the categories
of authenticity and of integrity, slip away into the
fulﬁllment of the Marxist diagnosis of the total
fetishization and commodiﬁcation of all labor, in-
cluding art production. The Work of Art in the Age
of Mechanical Reproduction is a work of grief, of
bereavement, of what could and would be lost, a
vision of sadly what not only would come to pass,
but pass unnoticed and unmourned. There would
be no work of mourning for the loss of meaning,
only the heady intoxication in the passing review of
images, of simulacra, of life experience reduced to
a screen.
Benjamin describes in the beginning in the
twentieth century, the loss of meaning inherent in
the turn to the mechanical reproduction of the
work of art. This reproduction is not merely the re-
making of images or artifacts, for this activity has
always been practiced, but through the means of
mechanical reproduction, an object  looses its
“aura”, or its authenticity as not only an original,
but as a singular expression on the part of an author,
or artist. Through mass reproduction and circulati-
on, the “aura” is lost through dissemination; it be-
comes what Derrida has termed “blanc”, as a coin
through circulation has the embossing worn away
until it no longer has any value as currency.3 The
reproduction is severed from its tradition, from its
origin, from its author, from its essential source of
transmission, and as such, becomes a mere image, a
simulacrum. In fact, for the ﬁrst time, the image not
only is detached from tradition, from its ritualistic,
communicative, and public function, but is in fact
“designed for reproducibility”.4 No longer are the
categories of authenticity or originality or truth
applicable, rather mere reproduction and dissemi-
nation. The function of art has, in this case, indeed
become solely bound up in the circulation of com-
modities—not reproduction in fact, but mere un-
ceasing multiplication of itself. Artistic value, then,
is no longer judged upon the old criteria of the
beautiful, the commodious, the authentic, the origi-
nal; rather on suitability for multiplication and dis-
semination. It is not the quality of the image, rather
the number of times the image is “exposed” which
becomes the important criteria. 
In this regard, the mass audience to which this
image is exposed becomes a critical component in
the equation, since the purpose of image is mere
reproduction and dissemination. One cannot have
multiplication and dissemination without passive
spectators willingly viewing the ﬂeeting semblances
upon the screen, as through a mirror darkly. Yet
similarly to the artist, the spectator has lost his sin-
gular point-of-view as well, reducible only to the
mass audience. Indeed, only before the masses
does the image have the status of existence. In the
age of mechanical reproduction, for Benjamin, “the
simultaneous contemplation of paintings by a large
public, … is an early symptom of the crisis of pain-
ting.”5 Detached from any possible meaning, and
indeed from any desire for meaning, the image
ﬂickers across the screen. Meaning is now opposed
to “effects”. The spectator no longer “contempla-
tes” the image; rather, “the distracted mass ‘ab-
sorbs’ the work of art”.6 Furthermore, this distrac-
tion has reached such a level of saturation that
mankind, in “its self-alienation, … can experience
its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the
ﬁrst order,”7 writes Benjamin. Yet, the vacuous mass
saturated with images must be stimulated in order
to continue viewing, if only to shock or to outrage
—and here only war will do.
Notably, Benjamin in 1936, still saw architecture
as a sort of sanctuary, a realm of artistic production
that had not succumbed to mechanical reproduc-
tion. All other forms of art production are superce-
ded by mechanical means, yet “the human need for
shelter is lasting”,8 argues Benjamin. Architecture,
although changing historically, remains true to its
origins, to its primordial roots, i. e. to shelter, to an
authentic relationship between viewer and object.
Indeed, embodied in architecture is not the mass
spectator per se, but the res publica. Architecture is
per deﬁnition a public art. Architecture, Benjamin
points out, is both a question of visual perception,
197
and the tactile. Architecture is spatial, and not to
be divorced from the haptic experience of space. Le
ﬂâneur still experienced the city with his feet, not
on a screen—passing, ﬂickering, images mediated
by others. So although Benjamin explored the
implications of modern life upon the city beginning
in the early 1920’s (what would later be collectively
called the Arcades Project), as well as his Notes
from Moscow, architecture itself had not yet be-
come a commodity. The so-called “urban phantas-
magoria” entailed the embodiment of boredom,
fashion, and the increasing availability of luxury
goods.9 The resultant impact on the post-industrial
city was a “city on display”, indeed a city of arcades
especially designed to display, to be seen, to be
represented, and ultimately to be consumed.
But Benjamin took shelter in a crumbling edi-
ﬁce. Already in the l’Ecole de Beaux Arts, architectu-
re was becoming dematerialized. As Stan Allen cites
his teacher: “architects don’t make buildings; they
make drawings of buildings”.10 So long before “vir-
tual reality”, architecture no longer “got its hands
dirty” with bricks, and steel and glass. Architects
wrote speciﬁcations, made working drawings for
others to build, and made contracts. At present,
architects hardly ever make drawings for buildings
(architects don’t even get ink on their hands); rat-
her, architects make virtual spaces, digital images.
Yet in virtual space, not only is this architecture not
haptic, but the res publica has been reduced to the
masses who consume serially the passing review of
images. (Many students of architecture never go to
work in architecture ﬁrms, they go to work in
gaming software design houses). Buildings take too
long to produce; only images of buildings are “fast”
enough to supply the streaming ﬂow of simulacra.
Remarkably, Benjamin warned that every reader
threatened to become a writer—not someone trai-
ned to be a writer, but a producer of texts. “The
distinction between author and public is about to
lose its basic character”,11 he warned. Indeed, only
the production of texts and images for the screen is
now required. Nonetheless, what Benjamin could
not foresee was the fact that the “reader” has beco-
me extinct; no one reads (let alone contemplates)
for all must be occupied in either the production or
consumption of the simulacra.
The production of meaning has been reduced to
the mechanical reproduction of simulacra, which
has in turn been reduced to the “streaming” ﬂows
of images. Knowledge has given way to mere infor-
mation, which has given way to ﬂeeting visual sti-
mulations, “designed for reproducibility”, and mul-
tiplied endlessly for the spectator, albeit a passive
one agglomerated into a “mass”. The mass must be
supplied. The mass must consume the image upon
a screen; the mass must continue to view the spec-
tacle in order to consume even more. In fact,
Benjamin’s regretful “simultaneous contemplation”
of a work of art, gives way to “simultaneous con-
sumption” of the visual.
The Ideal-Copy Distinction
This term, simulacrum, is not an invention of the
twentieth century; rather, comes from the ancient
Greeks. Simulacrum (noun) is from the Latin verb,
simulare, “to feign”, meaning 1) an image, or 2) a
mere semblance, vague representation, or sham. As
such, a simulacrum is the lowest form of knowing
possible in the Platonic Ideal theory. Plato had set
up the distinction between the Ideal and the copy,
or “real being” and “becoming” in the Sophist. Real
being (ontos) was unchanging and only accessed by
the soul through reﬂection. Becoming (genesis), on
the other hand, was mutable and available to sense
perception.12 Not only was “becoming” characteri-
zed by its ability to change, but also the ability to
act and be acted upon. Real being, by contrast, was
immutable and unable to act. In the earlier dia-
logues, Plato admitted only these two Forms. 
In the Timaeus, Plato again makes the distinc-
tion between the pattern that is Ideal and un-
changing, and the copy that is constructed. Because
the world is sensible and changing, it is therefore a
copy, or likeness, of an original eternal pattern.
That which is changeless and eternal must be inva-
riant and irrefutable; that is, (to on) “real things”,
being. That which is becoming, is however a mere
likeness, (eikon). Similarly, real existence, (ontos on)
is distinguished from “a sort of existence” eidolon.13
Being, (to ontos), is opposed to becoming (genesis)
and coming-into-being (genesis eis ousian), that is
to say becoming an individual thing.14 For Plato is
his Ideal form theory, the universe, necessarily, is
modeled on the likeness of this perfect idea. This
notion of the ideal and the copy, however, is not
just a distant theory from ancient Greece. The
ideal/copy distinction also has determined for more
than two thousand years our conceptions of  know-
ledge and the possibility of meaning. Quite simply,
the closer that the word or image conformed to
“reality”, the truer it was.
Only the dialectical method is capable of ascen-
ding upward from an intelligible footing or founda-
tion, to the ultimate “ﬁrst principle”, arché. All
other methods are concerned with true opinion,
with becomings, with what can be moved by per-
suasion. For unless the gods and those few men
proceed carefully to the arché, they will not possess
intelligence (noesis) or knowledge (episteme). In the
end, only the dialectician who had ascended to the
ﬁrst principle is capable of giving an “exact account
of the true essence of each thing.”15 Plato reiterates
in the Timaeus the place of the intelligible/rational
and the true opinion/sensible. The reason why the
Timaeus is so important is precisely because it
attempts to address some of the unresolved pro-
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blems of the earlier dialogues—the transition from
the immutable Forms to the sensible particulars in
constant ﬂux. Nevertheless, the simulacra remain
outside of the ideal-copy distinction. The simulacra
are “feigning”, a mere semblance, vague represen-
tation, or sham of the eidolon, unable to give us
access to a true knowledge of things. 
Baudrillard and the Production of
Simulacra16
In The System of Objects (1968),17 a very important
turn is made from the Platonic notion of the Ideal
and the copy. Suddenly, in Baudrillard’s analysis of
the Post-War French consumption society, the
model becomes, not the ideal that is to be copied,
but the reproducible copy itself. He says: “The work
of art does not answer to the model/series scheme
either. The same categorical alternative is posed
here as for a machine: the machine fulﬁls or does
not fulﬁl a function, the work of art is genuine or
fake. There are no marginal differences. Only at the
level of the private and personalize object (not at
the level of the work itself) does the model/series
dynamic come into play.”18 Baudrillard gives the
example of the washing machine—the post-war
consumer object par excellence. In the serialization
of mechanical production the original is lost; “every
object becomes a model”, Baudrillard argues, “yet
at the same time there are no more models.”19 As a
consequence, Baudrillard recognizes an inversion of
the Platonic ideal/copy distinction; the real model
is that which is serially reproducible. This series
does not lead to the knowledge of the Ideal, rather
to the next model, the next reproducible desire, for
each must give way to the next in order to feed
capitalist production. 
The reference is then not to an Ideal, rather to
the circulation or play between “signs”, which are
the images of objects that in themselves are “de-
signed for reproducibility”. Capitalism, of course,
was always dependent upon economic growth, per
deﬁnition. However, what is at work here is not
simply the increased production and the resultant
increased consumption, rather the production of
desire, for the consumption must itself be a questi-
on of ever-increasing growth. And it is this produc-
tion of desire that gives rise to the “society of the
spectacle”, the “simultaneous contemplation” of
the multiplication of images that excite the desire
to consume. The case here is consequently not the
iteration of meaning, but serial reproduction and
the repetition of the same. The model is already a
copy; the model is just next years model of a was-
hing machine—not really “new”—but marketed as a
“new” model.
By 1970, in his analysis of the consumer society
situated within French Saussaurian semiotics and
neo-Marxist critique, the ﬂuidity of objects and
needs becomes a kind of circulation of signs for
Baudrillard. An object has already become—not
exactly interchangeable because of minute differen-
ces, but able to be substituted one with the other
in the exchange system of commodities. “Within
the ﬁeld of their objective function”, Baudrillard
argues, “objects are not interchangeable, but outsi-
de the ﬁeld of its denotation, an object becomes
substitutable in a more or less unlimited fashion. In
this ﬁeld of connotations the object takes on the
value of a sign. In this way a washing machine ser-
ves as equipment and plays as an element of com-
fort, or prestige, etc. It is the ﬁeld of play that is
speciﬁcally the ﬁeld of consumption. Here all sorts
of objects can be substituted for the washing ma-
chine as a signifying element. In the logic of signs,
as in the logic of symbols, objects are no longer
tied to a function or to a deﬁned need.”20
However, by 1972, in For a Critique of the
Political Economy of Sign, Baudrillard has made a
further turn away from not only the Platonic ideal-
copy distinction but the de Saussaurian semiotic
reading of the consumer object embedded within
an interplay of signiﬁers. Radically, the objects
themselves are not the signiﬁed; rather the circula-
tion of images themselves, divorced from any possi-
ble referent, begins to be problemitized. The “con-
sumer society” gives way to the “society of the
spectacle”. Exchange value, for Marx, was always
predicated upon equivalence. However, in the
system of exchange value that was being diagnosed
in post-war Europe, a system of need became so
rariﬁed and abstracted as to be in fact “aliened”
from any simply deﬁnable need: “I am hungry; I will
buy bread”. Baudrillard begins to articulate in the
early 1970’s, that “at the present stage of consum-
mative mobilization, to see that needs, far from
being articulated around the desire or the demand
of the subject, ﬁnd their coherence everywhere”.21
As a consequence, all needs are abstracted and
translated into an equivalent in terms of the curren-
cy of desire. “Everything surging from the subject,
his or her body and desire, is dissociated and cata-
lyzed in terms of needs, more or less speciﬁed in
advance by objects. All instincts are rationalized,
ﬁnalized and objectiﬁed in needs—hence symboli-
cally cancelled.”22 This essay is absolutely pivotal in
the development of Baudrillard’s thought: need is
no longer tied to exchange value, but totally set
free in a system of economic circulation whereby
the need itself is that which is produced in order to
multiply or to expand the reproduction of itself.
This move, then, allows Baudrillard to analyze
the production of desire, and its concurrent eco-
nomy of signs, the production of simulacra. In the
seminal essay, Symbolic Exchange and Death (c.
1976), which refers to a critique both of Marx and
Freud’s notion of the death drive, he outlines the
three stages or orders of simulation:23
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– the counterfeit (up to the timeframe of the indu-
strial revolution),
– production (the industrialization period, and thus
the object of Marxian analysis),
– simulation (the twentieth-century, post-war con-
sumption society, dominated by the circulation of
images).
Baudrillard acknowledges his debt to Benjamin, for
he says, it was Benjamin “who ﬁrst separated the
implications of [the] principle of reproduction, …
[showing] that reproduction absorbs the process of
production and alters its goals, the status of the
product and the producer … Benjamin and
McLuhan saw that the real message, the real ulti-
matum, lay in reproduction itself, and that produc-
tion, as such, has no meaning; its social ﬁnality gets
lost in seriality.”24 As such, serial production of
“models” is divorced from any referent, any “truth”
or conformity to a “model” as ideal; rather, “mod-
els” are simply the reproduction and dissemination
of simulacra. In this schema, which Baudrillard attri-
butes to the post-war consumer society, the old
order of the “real” as deﬁned as “that for which it is
possible to provide and equivalent representati-
on.”25 Yet this being impossible, the order of the
“hyperreal” is ushered in, where the possibility of
representation (with any possible referent or
signiﬁer) is happily abandoned because it operates
under its own “code”, the circulation of the “realm
of simulation”. The realm of simulation usurps the
production of signiﬁcation. Thus, Baudrillard con-
cludes, “in fact, we must interpret hyperrealism
inversely: today, reality itself is hyperrealistic.”26
Indeed, not only is reality “hyperrealistic”, but
ideas or concepts themselves are caught up in the
multiplication of the simulacra. Baudrillard states:
“Theoretical production, like material production, is
also losing its determinations and is beginning to
spin on its own, disconnectedly, en abîme, towards
an unknown reality. Today, we are already at that
point: in the realm of undecidability, in the era of
ﬂoating theories, like ﬂoating currencies. Every cur-
rent theory, from whatever horizon it originates
(including psychoanalysis), with whatever violence it
arms itself, pretending to recover an immanence or
ﬂuidity without referent (Deleuze, Lyotard, etc.)—
all are ﬂoating, and their only purpose is to signal
one another. It is futile to fault them for lack of
coherence by appealing to some sort of ‘reality’.
The system has removed from theoretical labor
power all referential guarantees, as it did in the
other realm. Theory no longer has any value either.
The mirror of theoretical production is also cracked.
And this is the order of things.”27 In the end, in the
ﬁnal stage of the orders of simulation, the dissemi-
nation of simulacra comes to be “the multiplication
of objects without an original.”28 Yet not only are
objects multiplied, but theories too are divorced
from any possible determination in truth, produced
and circulated like the newest “model” of washing
machine.
At this point in the late 1970’s and early
1980’s, Baudrillard whole-heartedly embraces the
multiplication of images, serially, as through a
cracked mirror29—without referent, without possi-
bility to appeal to “truth”, without regret. Indeed,
by 1981, in “Simulacra and Simulations”, perhaps
his most deﬁnitive description of the true Greek
meaning of simulacra occurs boldly in a section ent-
itled “the divine irreference of images”, he states,
“to dissimulate is to feign not to have what one
has. To simulate is to feign, to have what one has-
n’t.” Yet, he goes on to say, to feign is not simply
not to tell the truth, for this move would leave
intact the old ideal-copy, truth-referent schema.
No, only the simulacra exist, as feigning, as uninter-
rupted exchange of images, bearing no relationship
to a possible “real”.30 Slogan-like, Baudrillard em-
phatically calls out: “simulation is the ecstasy of the
real”.31
In this addiction to the ephemeral surface, then,
the criteria of originality or authenticity could only
seem laughable. The category of the “new” replaces
that of the “original”. Production is not of meaning,
rather the multiplication of “effects”. In order to
have a “reproduction”, an original is necessary. Yet
the original is lost as well. Only the “new” remains
to be disseminated; indeed, the images are design-
ed to be circulated. Furthermore, although Baudril-
lard followed Benjamin in his critique of modes of
representation, Baudrillard abandons all regret, and
fully embraces the ecstasy of simulacra, of the cir-
culation of images feigning.
Reading the earlier works of Baudrillard, he
began with a neo-Marxist critique of the status of
production. Capitalist production was no longer a
question of labor/capital/proﬁt-land (the so-called
“Trinity Formula”). In the development of capita-
lism, the production not only became transitory, so-
called “soft production”—not of goods, but of ser-
vices—but production became the production of
itself. What was produced were in fact images,
without context or referent; indeed, not production
of a product, but the production of desire for a pro-
duct. So, in tracing the development of Baudril-
lard’s thought as the natural successor to Benjamin,
through his neo-Marxist critiques, to the abandon-
ment of nostalgia for the possibility of meaning and
“regret”, to the full-embrace of the simulacra; we
glimpse the status of representation in the digital
age. 
In reading some of the critiques of Baudrillard’s
work and the obituaries after his death in January
2007, one could easily get the impression that he
had always believed in the surface. Indeed, Baudril-
lard could be accused of “making a spectacle of
himself”, both in the Debordian sense, and in the
sense of the expression in English where to “make a
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spectacle of yourself” is to intentionally make your-
self into a clown, a person not to be taken serious-
ly, a fool in fact. Yet Baudrillard, in surﬁng the wave
of “star philosopher” was a phenomenon of the
time, yes, a spectacle, a simulacrum; perhaps in-
deed intentionally making himself the fool, for let
us remember only the fool may criticize the king.32
So if we say with Baudrillard, “no regrets!”
goodbye correspondence theory of meaning, good-
bye representation of artistic truth, goodbye auto-
nomous, singular, original works of art; we are hap-
pily swimming in the stream of images. Not only
have we given up meaning, but also given up the
possibility of representing truth to ourselves; we
have given up the criteria with which to judge what
we have made. The digital representations ﬂow
past, without grasping what they are and how they
are produced. We are merely asked to consume
them—not judge them, not “read” them, not “con-
template them”. 
In Walter Benjamin’s canonical essay of The
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,
he signaled several important phenomena: objects
become intentionally “designed for reproducibility”.
No longer are the categories of authenticity or ori-
ginality or truth applicable, rather reproduction and
dissemination, a mere unceasing multiplication of
images themselves. Furthermore, the “mass market”
requires “simultaneous contemplation”, giving rise,
of course, to all forms of mass media for the repro-
duction of need, of desire, of “effects”. And ultima-
tely, in a society dominated by images designed for
reproducibility, the consumers themselves must
necessarily be made to consume, maintaining the
perpetuum mobile of hyper-capitalism.
Indeed, we are not naïve. We no longer expect
art or architecture to be anything like “permanent”,
“true”, or even “beautiful”. For centuries, architec-
ture and its means of representation could be said
to be a stable collection of tools of representation:
drawings, models and speciﬁcations. No confusion
abounded as to the conﬂation of categories of the
represented object and the “thing” itself, the three-
dimensional architectural object. Vitruvius had
already, in the ﬁrst century B. C., deﬁned “good”
architecture as ﬁrmitas, utilitas, venustas—that is to
say, ﬁrmness or strongly supported; useful or ﬁt for
a speciﬁc purpose, commodious; and graceful,
beautiful, and charming. 
In the age of digital representation, I propose
three new categories: the mutable; the ephemeral;
the sensational. Architecture is mutable in the age of
digital representation, not only because of the
speed at which the image is mediated, but also pre-
cisely because it is mediated, constantly mutated
from one medium to another. Architecture is ephe-
meral in that as a haptic experience, architecture is
“written” on the body, and thus is necessarily “of
the moment”. As much as we try to capture archi-
tecture as something stable, space itself is a con-
stantly changing space/time. Further, architecture in
the age of digital representation is sensational, not
only in the sense that the architectural press drives
the architectural image, but also because sensation
is always the foundation of a perception of space.
We must not forget the most important thing about
architecture is that architecture is a three-dimensio-
nal spatial experience—not a digital image. Further-
more, digital representation is a tool, and like any
tool, is not to be confused with that which it repre-
sents. The pen and paper are not the book. Simi-
larly, digital imaging is not the space.
Undoubtedly, many architectural designs execu-
ted or facilitated in some way through digital repre-
sentations are quite compelling. An architect uses
the tools to hand, including the most recent anima-
tion and graphic softwares. Yet in the   throws of
seduction of these tools, a pause is necessary in
order to access what exactly we are producing.
Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of Mecha-
nical Reproduction" signaled the loss of “aura”, of
what could and would be lost. Yet, this loss would
pass unnoticed and unmourned. Baudrillard’s
hyper-reality divorced from any possible signiﬁcati-
on would serve only to radicalize the loss. Never-
theless, here we pause in the unremitting consump-
tion of the image, in order to brieﬂy examine the
dangers of fully giving oneself uncritically over to
the intoxicating ﬂow of simulacra, and remember,
concerning architecture: the image is not space. 
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